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 REASONS AND CONSCIOUS PERSONS 
 Christian Coseru 
 Introduction 
 What justifies holding the person that we are today morally responsible for some-
thing we did a year ago? And why are we justified in showing prudential concern for 
the future welfare of the person we will be a year from now? Whatever our answer 
to these questions, it seems that we cannot systematically pursue them without in 
one way or another referring to persons and their identity over time. But while 
there is widespread agreement that considerations about personal identity must be 
front and center in any such inquiries, such agreement falls short when it comes 
to specifying the criteria for personal identity, that is, what this identity necessarily 
involves or consists in. Part of the difficulty is that an investigation into the nature 
of personal identity brings us to metaphysical questions about persons, their onto-
logical status, identity conditions, and persistence over time. The challenge, then, is 
to pursue these additional questions without losing sight of the practical concerns 
that prompted them in the first place. 
 Few contemporary philosophers have confronted this challenge with more ana-
lytic skill, depth, and ingenuity than Derek Parfit. In engaging with Parfit’s work 
on personal identity, primarily his  Reason and Persons , my aim is to reassess his 
Reductionist View of personal identity in light of Buddhist Reductionism, a philo-
sophical project grounded on the idea that persons reduce to a set of bodily, sen-
sory, perceptual, dispositional, and conscious elements, which alone are real. Parfit 
is not only familiar with this Buddhist conception of personal identity, but thinks 
that the reductionist, no ownership position he defends, which takes persons both 
to exist and to reduce to their components, is true, and that, as he famously puts 
it, “Buddha would have agreed” (1984: 273). My goal here is threefold:  first, to 
review Parfit’s Reductionism position and evaluate its main arguments; second, to 
assess the extent to which Buddhist Reductionism supports Parfit’s psychological 
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criterion for personal identity; and finally, to suggest some ways in which Buddhist 
conceptions of mind and consciousness can help to advance the contemporary 
debate on personal identity. 
 Reductionism and personal identity 
 What is reductionism and how does it relate to the question of personal identity? 
The literal sense of the term, derived from the Latin ‘ reducere ’ (lit. ‘bring back’, ‘lead 
back’), captures rather well the philosophical notion of reduction: to reduce is ‘to 
lead back’ to something more fundamental than the thing in question. To say that 
the mental reduces to the physical, that motion reduces to kinetic energy, and that 
psychology reduces to biology, is to capture what it means for one thing (mind, 
motion, or psychology) to be brought back to the other (physical, kinetic energy, or 
biology). Reduction, then, stands for the view that, if entity  x reduces to entity  y , 
then  y is prior to, more basic than, or constitutive of  x . 1 As a philosophical term of 
art, ‘reduction’ is central both to metaphysical questions of personal identity and to 
questions in philosophy of mind about consciousness, agency, and the mind- body 
problem. One is a reductionist if one takes a particular theory or phenomenon to 
be conceivable in terms of, or reducible to, another theory or phenomenon. 2 
 Parfit is one such reductionist, and  Reasons and Persons contains his vastly influ-
ential theory of personal identity, which argues against the commonsensical, non- 
reductionist view of persons. According to the non- reductionist view, persons are 
distinct and discrete entities that exist over and above their bodies and psychological 
states. Their identity, then, is an irreducible, brute fact of existence, and cannot be 
explained or described in more basic terms. Whatever persons are, an account of 
their identity would have to employ person- level descriptive categories of embodied 
experience. 3 One paradigmatic example for person in this non- reductive sense is 
the Cartesian Ego. For Parfit the view that there are such entities as Cartesian Egos 
or souls is representative of a particular intuition about personal identity, according 
to which we assume that questions of the sort ‘Will I survive the death of my body?’ 
or ‘Will I  be the same person if I were to be teleported elsewhere?’ must have 
definitive answers. Regardless of whether or not we have answers to these questions 
at present, given their implications for personal identity, answers must in principle 
be available. There must be a way to settle these questions one way or another, per-
haps on the basis of our very conception of what personal identity entails. What 
drives this intuition, argues Parfit, is the assumption that our identity must in some 
sense be  determinate (1984: 214). 
 If we reject this intuition and allow for the possibility that Cartesian Egos do 
not exist, then, argues Parfit, we are in a sense compelled to accept the view of 
Reductionism. One of the advantages of Reductionism is that it offers new pos-
sibilities for reconceiving the problem of personal identity on both metaphysical 
and empirical grounds. Since the body is the seat of our physical, affective, and 
mental lives, we may conceive of persons as (i) bodies or as (ii) entities that have 
bodies, thoughts, and emotions. The first conception can also be understood as an 
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endorsement of one version of the  identity view (persons just  are bodies), while the 
second makes the case for the  ownership view (persons are the sort of entities that 
 have bodies, thoughts, and other kinds of experiences). As Parfit makes clear, whereas 
the ownership or constitutive view of personal identity can be easily entertained, 
and may even fit classical conceptions of persons as property- possessors, the iden-
tity view of reductionism opens the door for something more radical: Eliminative 
Reductionism, the best example of which is the mind/ brain identity theory. For 
the eliminative reductionist, persons, much like nations, are ultimately reducible to 
their constitutive parts. Just as the concept of a nation cannot be the concept of 
an entity that is distinct from its people and its territory, so also the concept of a 
person cannot be that of an entity that exists over and above its body, perceptions, 
thoughts, and feelings. We may thus conclude, argues Parfit, “that, in that case, there 
are really no such things as nations. There are only groups of people, living together 
in certain ways” (2002: 656). 
 What does it mean to extend this analogy and to claim that there are really no 
such things as persons? On Parfit’s general characterization of reductionism, the 
existence of persons, then, “just involves the existence of a brain and body, the 
doing of certain deeds, the thinking of certain thoughts, the occurrence of certain 
experiences” (1984: 2011). The force of this reductionist move is captured by the 
‘just consists in’ locution:  all of the facts that pertain to a person’s existence– – 
their particular type of body, their psychological profile, the kinds of relations that 
obtain between their mental and brain states, all of these admit of an impersonal 
description that neither requires nor presupposes this particular person exist. As a 
 fa ç on de parler , however, we do say that, because we can ascribe thoughts to them, 
thinkers exist. But just because we can infer from the content of their experience 
that there are thinkers, it does not follow that their existence is somehow separate 
from their thoughts. Parfit endorses the impersonal description thesis ( 1984 : 225) 
even as he acknowledges, with Peter Strawson and Bernard Williams, that any talk 
of experiences, and of the various relations that obtain between them, is impos-
sible without reference to the persons whose experiences they are. Although he 
would subsequently disavow it (Parfit  1999 ), on the grounds that a thoroughly 
impersonal conceptual schema would be ineffective for the kind of creature we 
are, the impersonal description thesis plays an important explanatory function for 
the view that personal identity over time just consists in physical and/ or psycho-
logical continuity. 
 To motivate both reductionism and the impersonal description thesis, Parfit 
provides the well- known example of the simple teletransportation (STT) machine. 
Suppose that in a future century when science is far advanced I am able to travel 
to a distant place, say Mars, simply by having a machine scan every cell of my 
body and broadcast the information in real time to another machine on Mars. 
There is one catch, however: my current body will be destroyed in the process of 
being scanned. On the up side, a qualitatively identical but numerically different 
body will be created on Mars. The initiation of the whole process is marked by a 
loss of consciousness, which is immediately gained once the complete body has 
been recreated on Mars. In principle, argues Parfit, we should be able to provide a 
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description of the person’s states at  t  1  , before entering the Earth STT, at  t  2  , while 
being teletransported, and at  t  3  , after exiting the Mars STT, without referring to the 
persons whose states they are. But while imaginary scenarios such as this do appear 
to support the impersonal description thesis, they raise a different set of questions, 
specifically about whether personal identity could be determinate. Upon waking 
up on Mars, am I the same or a different person? Assuming that the two persons are 
similar enough psychologically, and that the latter’s personality, consciousness, and 
memories are caused by the former’s, we would have to conclude that they really 
are the same person, but at different stages. In this case, causal dependence would 
indeed serve as a necessary and sufficient criterion for personal identity. 
 But as Parfit concedes, such scenarios are not entirely unproblematic for the 
psychological theory of personal identity. Consider the second scenario, where an 
advanced teletransportation (ATT) machine has the same scanning capabilities as 
the STT, plus the added feature of leaving the scanned body intact. In this case, 
having undergone teletransportation, and on the assumption that the person I am 
on Earth is psychologically very similar to the one I am now on Mars, one would 
find oneself in two places at once. One advantage of this second scenario is that 
it provides a compelling reason for adopting some version of the ‘body’ theory of 
personal identity. But neither scenario addresses the many objections to the imper-
sonal description thesis such as, for instance, that reductionism cannot explain in a 
non- question- begging way how exactly we get persons from impersonal psycho-
physical elements. 
 The teleportation examples aim to drive home the point that personal identity 
is indeterminate, and that reductionists must contend with a situation in which 
questions about the mode of existence of persons may yield no definitive answers. 4 
Notwithstanding these problems, Parfit thinks such examples are compelling 
enough to warrant that we take reductionism seriously, and presents us with two 
distinct conceptions of reductionism about persons: 
 (1)  a person just is a particular brain and body and a series of interrelated physical 
and mental events; and 
 (2)  a person is an entity that is  distinct from a brain and body and such a series of 
events; (1984: 211) 
 Although he thinks that (1), which articulates the eliminativist version of reduc-
tionism, is justified in some instances (it is right to claim that “there were really 
no witches, only persecuted women” (2002: 657)), his conception of persons as 
rational and moral agents clearly compels him to accept (2). Furthermore, Parfit 
insists on the importance of thinking about persons not in terms of their mental 
states, which would entail that they must be the states of some entity, but in terms 
of the occurrence of certain experiences, deeds, and thoughts. Thus understood, all 
reductionists would accept the view that: 
 (3)  a person’s existence just consists in the existence of a brain and body, and the 
occurrence of a series of interrelated physical and mental events (1984: 211). 
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 Now contrast this view with that of the non- reductionist: 
 (4)  a person is a separate existing entity, distinct from their brain and body, and 
their experiences (1984: 210) 
 But Parfit clearly distinguishes between two non- reductionist views. The common 
one, already noted, is that of a person as a purely mental entity, a Cartesian Pure 
Ego, soul, or spiritual substance. On this view, “personal identity over time does 
not just consist in physical and/ or psychological continuity” (1984: 210). Rather, 
the Cartesian Ego is an altogether different metaphysical entity. The second non- 
reductionist view denies that persons are separately existing entities, distinct from 
their brains, bodies, and experiences: 
 (5)  though we are not separately existing entities, personal identity is a further 
fact, which does not just consist in physical and/ or psychological continuity 
(1984: 210) 
 Parfit calls this the  Further Fact View . The typical non- reductionist view articulates a 
familiar conception of personal identity, whose basic premise is that human beings 
(and perhaps other forms of life) must be conceived in terms of something essential, 
without which we could not ascribe to them the properties of persons. Unlike the 
typical non- reductionist view, the further fact view poses a conundrum: what we 
have here is both the notion that persons are not metaphysically distinct entities and 
the notion that their existence cannot be accounted for in purely impersonal terms. 
On the further fact view, then, the concept of person is simple and unanalyzable. 
Parfit’s account of personal identity, which had initially drawn on the reductionist 
no- self view of Buddhist Abhidharma, 5 may be more profitably associated with 
one Buddhist school of thought, Personalism (Pudgalav ā da), that did indeed defend 
a conception of person as irreducible (more about the arguments adduced in its 
support in the next section). 
 Before we turn to the Buddhist discussions of personal identity, a brief over-
view of Parfit’s psychological criterion of personal identity is in order. 6 Parfit takes 
the ‘criterion’ for identity to stand for “what this identity necessarily involves, or 
consists in” (1984: 202). In the case of physical objects such as the pyramids or the 
Moon that simply refers to the concrete spatio- temporal continuity of the object in 
question. So far as our physical body is concerned, the criterion of personal iden-
tity would simply consist in the persistence of this body and brain over time. Parfit 
offers what he assumes is a better version of the ‘ physical criterion ’: what is necessary 
for personal identity is the persistence of  enough of the body and the brain over 
time, such that even if we were to lose some of the body and brain (through ampu-
tation or hemispherectomy) the same person would continue to exist. Nonetheless, 
on the physical criterion of personal identity, the case of STT would not count 
as persistence over time and neither would that of rebirth, which presuppose that 
something of oneself continues beyond the destruction of the body. This is largely 
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the reason why Parfit thinks the physical criterion does not suffice, and why instead 
he puts forward a psychological criterion of personal identity, which he understands 
as involving two relations:
 Psychological connectedness is the holding of particular direct psychological 
connections. 
 Psychological continuity is the holding of overlapping chains of strong 
connectedness 
 1984: 206 
 Although Parfit takes connectedness, which is a matter of degree, to be a more 
important relation, he does not think it serves as an adequate criterion for personal 
identity. Strong connectedness is a transitive relation, since the person I am today is 
strongly connected to the one I was yesterday, and to the one I was three days ago. 
But it cannot be true that the person I am today is strongly connected to the one 
I was twenty years ago, and so, despite its importance, the strong relation of psycho-
logical connectedness is too problematic for personal identity: “Because identity 
is a transitive relation, the criterion of identity must also be a transitive relation. 
Since strong connectedness is not transitive, it cannot be the criterion of identity” 
(1984: 206). What about psychological continuity? Parfit uses the continuity rela-
tion to introduce his ‘ psychological criterion ’ of personal identity:
 There is  psychological continuity if and only if there are overlapping chains 
of strong connectedness. X today is one and the same person as Y at some 
past time if and only if (2) X is psychologically continuous with Y, (3) this 
continuity has the right kind of cause, and (4) it has not taken a ‘branching’ 
form. (5) Personal identity over time just consists in the holding of facts like 
(2) to (4). 
 1984: 206 
 The key elements here are (2) psychological continuity and (3) right causal deter-
mination, and Parfit uses right causal determination to further distinguish between 
 narrow ,  wide , and  widest versions of the psychological criterion depending on 
whether the cause is identifiably the correct one, any reliable cause, or any cause 
whatsoever. These additional criteria provide a basis for introducing the memory 
element, since being able to remember past experiences as one’s own is essential to 
the psychological criterion of personal identity. Memory thus stands as an example 
of strong connectedness between, for instance, an experience once had and later 
remembered or an intention once formed and later acted upon. These sorts of 
direct causal connections that memory, intention, and action provide are typically 
of a short duration. I seldom act on intentions formed twenty years ago, and distant 
childhood memories have already been embedded in a complex self- narrative that 
had undergone revision and embellishment over time (even though Parfit takes it 
to be a logical truth that we can only remember our own experiences). 7 So, while 
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there may be few direct connections between, say, the 50- year- old adult and the 
10- year- old child, they are still indirectly connected through multiple overlapping 
chains of direct connectedness. The overlapping chains model thus serves to illus-
trate Parfit’s understanding of the criterion for psychological continuity, whose 
functionality is such that we can talk of the child I was once and the adult I am 
today in one breath. 
 While the narrow account of causal determination serves as a plausible 
way to understand persistence over time, it cannot accommodate the simple 
teletransportation case. For this reason, Parfit thinks we need the wide and even 
widest views of causality. The wide view allows any reliable causal chain to serve as 
a criterion for personal identity. The widest view is even more permissible, allowing 
for any causal chain to play this role (a requirement for the persistence of identity 
in the ATT case). Since Parfit claims that there is no good reason to prefer the 
narrow view over the others, we are confronted with a problematic notion of per-
sistence: just what it means to say the person I am now on Mars is psychological 
continuous with the one I was on Earth an hour ago is not exactly clear. And it is 
even more puzzling to entertain what it would be like to talk of personal identity 
between the two versions of myself in the ATT case. What is clear is Parfit’s motiv-
ation for articulating these two views, both of which allow for a conception of per-
sistence over time that reduces the person to certain chains of causal connectedness 
between mental and physical states. The issue is not whether the same individual 
persists over time, including in the ATT case. Rather, the problem is how best to 
guarantee there is enough resemblance between the different person stages. Even 
so, in articulating his psychological criterion, Parfit does not aim to secure a strong 
foundation for personal identity; rather, he wants to demonstrate that the persist-
ence of identity is not an important factor when it comes to matters of moral and 
practical concern. 
 Now that we have identified the two primary elements of Parfit’s theory of 
personal identity, let us consider to what extent Buddhist Reductionism supports 
Parfit’s psychological criterion for personal identity. 
 Buddhist reductionism, personalism, and the no- self view 
 As is well known, in an effort to demonstrate that his views are not the product of 
a particular culture and epoch, but rather apply to all people at all time, Parfit turns 
to, inter alia, Buddhism, where he finds an early reductionist stance not unlike his 
own. As he notes:
 I claim that, when we ask what persons are, and how they continue to exist, 
the fundamental question is a choice between two views. On one view, we 
are separately existing entities, distinct from our brain and bodies and our 
experiences…The other view is the Reductionist View. And I claim that, of 
these, the second view is true…  Buddha would have agreed. 
  1984: 273 
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 Whether or not Buddha would have agreed depends in large measure on whether 
Buddhist Reductionism articulates something close to a psychological criterion of 
personal identity. I will argue that it does, although in a way that emphasizes the 
structural dynamics of conscious experience over accounts of psychophysical causal 
relations (of the sort that Parfit’s reductionist view of persons endorses). One of 
the clearest articulations of Buddhist Reductionism about persons is found in  The 
Questions of Milinda ( Milindapa ñ ha ), an eloquent para- canonical work in the style of 
a Platonic dialogue detailing an exchange between N ā gasena (a Buddhist monk) 
and Milinda (better known as the Bactrian King Menander I) aimed at articulating 
a nominalist conception of personal identity. In a much- quoted passage, N ā gasena 
explains that, although he responds to a certain appellation– – his name– – there is no 
corresponding referent:
 Sir, I  am known as ‘N ā gasena’; my fellows in the religious life address me 
as ‘N ā gasena’. Although my parents gave (me) the name ‘N ā gasena’…it is 
just an appellation, a form of speech, a description, a conventional usage; 
‘N ā gasena’ is only a name, for no person is found here. 
 Horner  1963 : 34 
 Parfit is familiar with  The Questions of Milinda , and appeals to this and to several 
other excerpts from Buddhist texts 8 to make the case that “the Reductionist View 
is not merely part of one cultural tradition. It may be, as I have claimed, the true 
view about all people at all times” (1984: 273). That Parfit’s view and that of the 
Buddhists bear a strong resemblance is both obvious and well documented. 9 What is 
less obvious is the extent to which Buddhist metaphysics supports the Reductionist 
View. To answer this question, I will turn to one of the most influential attempts to 
show how Buddhist resources could help Parfit address some of the difficulties of his 
reductionist account while working out the implications of a Parfitian- style concep-
tual framework for Buddhist philosophy in general, and for Buddhist Reductionism 
in particular: Siderits’  Personal Identity and Buddhist Philosophy (1997/ 2015). 10 
 Following Parfit, Siderits too acknowledges that reductionism comes in a var-
iety of forms, and that when situated in the Buddhist context one must not over-
look the (historical) fact that not all Buddhists are reductionists. Nonetheless, 
within the context of early Buddhist scholasticism (viz., Abhidharma), all Buddhist 
philosophers who, in addition to being reductionists about composite entities such 
as chariots, forests, and armies, also take a reductionist stance with regard to persons, 
may be identified as Buddhist Reductionists. As Siderits explains, a distinctive fea-
ture of Buddhist Reductionism is the two truths framework, which takes sentences 
to be either conventionally or ultimately true depending on whether they lead to 
successful practice or to what is taken to be ultimately real (2015: 16). For instance, 
Buddhists take partite entities such as chariots to be conceptually constructed and 
thus not ultimately real. Thus chariots reduce to ‘axle’, ‘felly’, and ‘linchpin’, which 
in turn reduce to their elemental parts, and so on. On this account, only impartite 
unanalyzable entities are ultimately real. Siderits reworks the two truths framework 
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into an account of semantic insulation, which he uses to justify the Buddhist 
Reductionist view that partite entities cannot be ultimately real. As he himself 
admits, this view, which articulates the position of mereological nihilism, “will 
strike many as giving an implausibly austere ontology” (2015: 14). Siderits finds 
some of the arguments adduced in its support compelling, though, as I will argue, 
for reasons that are not entirely clear. What, then, motivates Buddhist Reductionists’ 
mereological nihilism? The answer lies in the widely- shared but, according to the 
reductionist, obviously mistaken non- reductionist stance that most people adopt:
 When the Buddhist Reductionist claims that strictly speaking chariots do 
not exist, that ‘chariot’ is a mere conventional designator for a collection of 
part arranged chariot- wise, this is meant to serve as an example of widely 
held belief that turns out not to be strictly speaking true, but also of a belief 
whose acceptance is perfectly understandable given the demands of everyday 
life. The point is not to get us to stop believing there are chariots. The point 
is to help us see how we could all be mistaken about ‘I’. For the mechanism 
that generates belief in a real ‘I’ is the same; hypostatization. What we have in 
both cases is a many masquerading as a one. 
 Siderits  2015 : 98 
 Does use of the first- personal pronoun and handling of the middle size dry goods 
that populate our mundane existence have such dramatic effects on belief gener-
ating processes and embodied practices? And if they do, how exactly can the dualist 
semantics of the two- truths framework undo our ingrained hypostatization procliv-
ities? The mereological nihilist singles out the effects on belief that configuration 
processes– – by which various parts in the world come to be arranged chariot- wise 
and person- wise– – can have when the demands of everyday life constrain one’s 
ontological outlook. Speedy and effective long- distance travel may demand that 
one avails oneself of various modes of transportation. Should we admit cars, trains, 
and airplanes in our final ontology? Sure, the car in the commercial is more than 
a wheeled and motorized mode of transportation; it is also a symbol of comfort, 
elegance, efficiency, and status. It has its own event horizon, and it promises to 
augment human experience in profound ways. Nonetheless, such demands should 
be recognized for what they are: alluring invitations to reify that which is ultimately 
only a collection of parts. 
 The belief ’s acceptance may well reflect conventional linguistic practices that, 
once fixed, make possible assertions in which it is actually true that there are 
chariots and cars. The problem, as Siderits carefully explains, is that with such cus-
tomary linguistic practices in place it becomes possible to assert both that there 
are such things as chariots and that there are certain parts that can be arranged 
chariot- wise. Semantic insulation between the two types of discourse may indeed 
give rise to anomalies, especially if one were to assert that both types of entities 
are real. But Siderits, following Thomasson ( 2007 ), thinks such anomalies indicate 
that the conditions under which something comes to be called a ‘chariot’ are not 
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always fixed by rules that apply to the discourse about parts, and so the existence of 
chariots, and of ordinary objects in general, can be vindicated. 
 However, it is an open question whether the dualist semantics of the two truths 
framework brings Buddhist Reductionism in line with the particular type that 
Parfit favors. Siderits thinks that it does, and considers a version of the teleporta-
tion scenario that aligns the two accounts, but in a way that does not eliminate the 
problem of indetermination. The question whether parts arranged a certain way are 
identical with or distinct from the chariot does not admit of a determinate answer, 
and neither does the question whether the swapping of parts from one to another 
chariot- wise arrangement results in an identical or different arrangement. Siderits’ 
proposed solution involves metalinguistic analysis:
 What we can do is ascent to a meta- language and discuss those relations 
between our uses of chariot on the one hand and ‘axle’ and the like on the 
other that explain why, when the parts are assembled in a certain way, we 
say there is a chariot, and why there may be cases where we do not know 
whether to say there is a chariot, or to say that there is diachronic identity 
between some present chariot and an earlier chariot. We can talk about the 
whole, or we can talk about the parts, but we cannot talk about both in the 
same breath. 
 2015: 110 
 The metalinguistic analysis solution may seem compelling enough in the case of 
chariots and other inanimate objects, but it confronts a paradox:  since the parts 
taken together in some degree of combination do not add up to a chariot, there 
are no such things as chariots. Parfit confronts the paradox while answering an 
objection from Bernard Williams against the view that we can get personal iden-
tity from a psychological spectrum. The objection concerns the sorites paradox. 
Run in the reverse, the argument considers a scenario in which, by means of small 
enough surgical interventions, a surgeon could cause a person to cease to be psy-
chologically continuous with previous stages of herself. If a surgeon could alter in 
small increments the neurochemistry of the brain in such a way as to profoundly 
transform the psychological features that make up who you are, does that mean you 
have ceased to exist? Parfit’s response considers the semantics of vague terms, and 
his solution to the sorites paradox comes in the form of an appeal to stipulation: we 
simply decide how many grains of sand to call a heap. But whereas stipulation may 
work for natural kinds such as forests it does not work for artifacts such as chariots. 
A chariot is not simply an arbitrary number of parts, but rather a definitive set of 
parts arranged such as to function as a ‘chariot’. These may vary depending on 
whether one considers extra features and embellishments, but one could agree on a 
minimum number of parts without which the concept chariot could not be mean-
ingfully applied to parts arranged chariot- wise. 
 But even if we adopted such a provisory stance, does that mean the argument 
would work in the case of persons? If Parfit is right, the physical criterion is not 
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enough for personal identity, which is why we need to consider the full spectrum of 
psychological states. Since persons are defined primarily in terms of the subjective 
and phenomenal character of their conscious mental states, how does Buddhist 
Reductionism solve the personal identity problem? It would seem that any account 
of persons requires person- level descriptive categories, a point that, as we noted 
above, Parfit himself concedes.
 Even Reductionists do not deny that people exist. And, on our concept of 
a person, people are not thoughts and acts. They are thinkers and agents. 
I am not a series of experiences, but the person who has these experiences. 
A Reductionist can admit that, in this sense, a person is what has experiences 
or the subject of experiences. This is true because of the way we talk. What a 
Reductionist denies is that the subject of experiences is a separately existing 
entity distinct from a brain and body, and a series of physical and mental 
events. 
 1984: 223 
 But in retaining a meaningful conception of ‘persons’  as thinkers and doers, Parfit’s 
view departs from mainstream Buddhist Reductionism only to join the ranks of 
the Buddhist Personalists. As expounders of the ‘personalist view’ ( pudgalav ā da ), 
Buddhist Personalists do agree with the general tenet of Buddhist Reductionism 
that there are no such things as enduring substantive selves. They also retain the 
bundle view and take ‘persons’ to be conceptualized in dependence upon the 
psychophysical aggregates. Where they differ, however, is in admitting that per-
sons, although neither identical nor different from the aggregates, are nonetheless 
real. It is unclear whether for the Buddhist Personalists persons enjoy the same 
ontological status as the aggregates, in part because they exhibit novel proper-
ties that neither of the aggregates do. What is clear, however, is that although the 
Personalists admit that the notion of ‘person’ is conceived in dependence upon the 
aggregates, they do not regard it as a conceptual fiction. Sustained efforts to reject 
Buddhist Personalism as an orthodox position form an integral part of Buddhist 
Reductionism. Historically, Buddhist Personalists were understood to have for-
gone commitment to the no- self doctrine. However, it is now possible to accom-
modate their views on an emergentist or supervenience account of phenomenal 
properties. 11 
 It is instructive that what makes Buddhist Personalism the target of criticism 
is a certain insistence on taking what we would now call the first- person per-
spective seriously, particularly as it finds articulation in discussions of the relation 
between consciousness and content. The key issue under dispute is the concept of 
person itself: if it stands simply for the collection of aggregates, then the Buddhist 
Reductionist is right to insist on its fictional status. However, if the concept of 
person is meant to capture something determinate, such as the view that per-
sons are self- conscious subjects, then it is hard to see how the reductionist can 
make the case that the concept of ‘person’ lacks a proper referent. Consider, for 
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instance, Vasubandhu’s refutation of personalism, and the argument that, since an 
individual can only possess ‘person- properties’ on account of possessing some 
sort of essence ( svabh ā va ), and since Buddhist metaphysics is anti- essentialist, there 
is no ontological basis for admitting entities defined in terms of their possession 
of person- properties. 12 On the argument put forth here, person- properties are 
those very things that allow us to use the first- person pronoun meaningfully 
in sentences such as ‘I am walking to my office’ or ‘I am thinking about the 
conversation we had yesterday’. The motivation for resisting such language use, 
according to Vasubandhu, reflects its unintended consequences: conceiving of the 
aggregates together as forming a person is a slippery slope to thinking there are 
such things as selves. To be clear, Vasubandhu does not reject the view that we 
do appear to ourselves to be more than just a body, or a bundle of feelings and 
thoughts. Rather, he rejects the notion that feelings, thoughts, and the body are 
something that we  possess . Such a view would entail an existence apart from the 
aggregates. But since we are  nothing but thoughts feelings, perceptions, memories, 
and bodies of a particular shape, size, and gender, no such residual existence is 
anywhere to be found. 
 In claiming that persons are conceived in  dependence upon or  in reliance upon 
the aggregates, though neither identical nor different from them, the Personalists 
invoke the  conceivability principle . The dispute, then, hinges on whether or not the 
object of conception must be identical with its causal basis. If no such identity rela-
tion were to obtain, then conceiving would lack reference, and would not point 
to anything in the world. But even on a strongly non- referential view, conceiving 
must be regarded as an effective epistemic practice that entails, inter alia, reference 
to nonconceptual entities (regardless of their ontological status). On a referential 
view of conception, thus, to  conceive of persons is to  conceive ourselves as persons. In 
conceiving of becoming a father I conceived of myself as a father. In conceiving 
of unicorns, I conceive of them as possible or impossible. On the personalist view, 
the aggregates may serve as a causal basis for our conception of person without 
being identical with it. Conception is indeed reliant on the presence of some mani-
fest phenomena, but conceiving of ‘ourselves’ in dependence upon the aggregates 
does not make ‘us’ identical with them. We conceive of fire in relation to fuel and 
of friendship in relation to common interest, but fire is not identical with fuel, 
nor is friendship identical with common interest. The Buddhist Personalist, pace 
Vasubandhu, wants to make the case that the object of conception is not always 
identical with its causal basis, which is why we can both retain a meaningful con-
ception of person and be reductionists about selves. 
 It would seem that this particular version of Buddhist Reductionism, which 
retains the concept of person (though not that of self) would support Parfit’s con-
ception of personal identity in the STT case, though not in the ATT case. Since 
the person is conceived in dependence upon the causal series, though not iden-
tical with it, I am sufficiently connected to the previous instance of myself prior to 
entering the Earth STT. The conceivability criterion of personalism makes the ATT 
case problematic, given that there is no way to differentiate between conceiving of 
9781138595118_pi-260.indd   171 20-Jan-20   13:50:57
172 Christian Coseru
myself in dependence upon the causal series now present on Mars as opposed to 
those still on Earth. 
 Might the person so conceived by Buddhist Personalists be a further fact, and 
could that be a mitigating factor against mereological nihilism? Siderits considers 
this objection by engaging some recent work in ontology, specifically Merricks’ 
( 2001 ) defense of eliminativism. Merricks’ view is that strictly speaking there are 
no such things as statues, only “atoms arranged statuewise.” In denying the exist-
ence of macroscopic objects, Merricks is not simply arguing against conventional 
uses of language, of the sort that take statement such as “there exists a statue” to 
mean “there exist atoms arranged statuewise” (2001:  3). Nor is he denying the 
existence of statues because statues are nothing over and above atoms arranged 
statuewise, and thus not mereologically distinct from their parts. Rather, he puts 
forward a complex argument from causal overdetermination: admitting that there 
exist such things as statues causally overdetermines their effects (because whatever 
effect can be attributed to a statue is already an effect of its microphysical parts). 
Since such overdetermination is not observed, we must admit that there are no such 
things as statues. 13 However, Merricks think the causal overdetermination argument 
does not apply in the case of human beings, because humans have causal powers 
that exceed those of their constitutive psychophysical parts. Most notably, humans 
instantiate  consciousness , a property that does not supervene on the body’s micro-
physical properties. 
 Merricks offers an interesting argument in support of this view operating on 
the premise that conscious and subjective mental properties bear the mark of being 
intrinsic. ‘Intrinsic properties’ are those properties “that an object can exemplify 
even if that object and its parts (if any) are the only objects that exist” (2001: 92). 
What is distinctive about humans is precisely that there is no metaphysical necessity 
that their intrinsic causal powers be implied by the existence of intrinsic properties 
of, and spatiotemporal and causal interaction among, their constituent elements. 
The argument goes as follow: suppose P, a conscious being, accidentally slices off 
her left index finger and thus shrinks. Suppose that at the very same moment of 
amputation, the atoms that compose her remain just as they were before amputa-
tion. The implication is that those atoms that are constitutive of P after amputation, 
are also constitutive of it immediately before amputation. Now, consider the pre- 
amputation finger- complement that is not identical with P (on the grounds that 
P has a part, the finger- complement, which the finger- complement itself simply 
lacks). If that is the case, and if we assume a relational view of consciousness (as a 
composite of atoms grouped by spatiotemporal and causal interrelations), then we 
must concede that before amputation there are two consciousnesses present, one for 
P and the other for the finger- compliment. But since we only ever have one such 
entity, P, the thesis that there are two consciousnesses must be false. Merricks thinks 
that to postulate the existence of a conscious pre- amputation finger- complement is 
to engage in an unacceptable multiplication of persons. 
 If it is true that the schema of the overdetermination argument does not apply 
to the effects a human causes by virtue of being conscious, then humans cannot be 
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treated as epiphenomenal entities. As composite entities capable of causing effects 
that our parts cannot redundantly cause by virtue of being conscious, we humans 
can resist the eliminative sweep of the reductionist. Now, Siderits is willing to grant 
that, were the argument from overdetermination to succeed, and the effects of con-
scious states are not systematically overdetermined, then we would have a forceful 
case for there being persons with causal effects that are irreducible to those of their 
constitutive psychophysical elements (2015: 112). This argument may not rehabili-
tate composite entities such as chariots, baseballs, or trees. But it would establish 
Parfit’s further fact version of Non- Reductionism:  persons are not just suitably 
arranged psychophysical aggregates that exhibit novel causal powers. Rather, per-
sons are what these specific aggregates are constituted as, which is why persons do 
not reduce to the aggregates in the same way that the chariot reduces to its com-
ponent parts, and the forest to the collection of trees. 
 The difference between Buddhist Reductionism and Buddhist Personalism 
should be clearer by now: whereas the reductivist claims that mental states strongly 
supervene on physical states and thus are reducible to the latter, the personalist 
takes them to possess novel causal powers that cannot be ontologically analyzed 
in terms of the properties of the physical states upon which they supervene. It 
is possible to interpret Buddhist Personalism as endorsing an emergentist view 
of persons and not simply a non- reductive physicalist view, but that would be 
dependent on how we interpret the ‘in reliance upon’ clause. Siderits’ response 
to the arguments against causal overdetermination takes up the problem of com-
patibility between four different positions Buddhist Reductionism must consider 
when debating the ontological status of persons: (1) dualism, (2) reductive physic-
alism, (3) non- reductive physicalism, and (4) emergentism. When considered in the 
context of debates about wholes and parts, these positions correspond respectively 
to (1) mereological realism, (2) reductive mereological nihilism, (3) non- reductive 
mereological nihilism, and (4)  emergentism (2015:  114). Drawing on contem-
porary debates on these issues, 14 Siderits admits that the non- reductive physicalist 
position (viz., mental states supervene on physical states but are not reducible 
to them) ought to, at least in principle, be compatible with emergentism (viz., 
mental states do supervene on physical states, but since they exhibit novel causal 
powers, physicalism must be false). The question, however, is whether conscious 
mental states, and by extension the person whose states they are, are fundamental 
despite being dependent upon the intrinsic properties of, and the spatiotemporal 
and causal interaction among, their constituent elements. Siderits thinks attempts 
to answer this question that appeal to the notion of downward causation face 
an explanatory gap, and so efforts to close that gap inevitably “push the non- 
reductivist in the direction of reductionism and identity” (2015:  116). So, the 
position is best classified as a version of the “non- reductive supervenience view” 
(2015: 117). But he does not agree that Buddhist Personalism offers a legitimate 
way to preserve the irreducibility of person- properties necessary for, say, negoti-
ating moral desert, and finds functionalist accounts of mental content compelling 
enough the resist the non- reductionist move. 
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 It is debatable whether the further- fact view of Buddhist Personalism is as 
inherently unstable as Siderits claims. In the next section, I will argue that it is 
not, and that considerations about self- consciousness threaten certain aspects of 
the Reductionist View, and thus render the conception of person (as conceived in 
dependence upon the aggregates, though neither identical nor different from them) 
essential for psychological accounts of personal identity. 
 Reflexivity, agency, and the unity of conscious experience 
 The much- quoted passage from  The Questions of Milinda ( Milindapa ñ ha ) discussed 
above– – in which N ā gasena argues against the ultimate reality of persons– – stands in 
sharp contrast to an equally important, but less celebrated, critical statement from 
his interlocutor, King Milinda, concerning the moral and pragmatic consequences 
of the no- self doctrine:
 If, most revered N ā gasena, no person is apprehended, then who gives you 
the offerings that you receive as a Buddhist monk? Who enjoys those things? 
Who practices disciplined conduct? Who enters into contemplation? Who 
attains to the goal of nirv ā ṇ a, which is the outcome of the path of cultiva-
tion? If, revered N ā gasena, one was to slay you, his would not be the crime 
or murder. 
 Horner  1963 : 100 
 As this passage makes clear, the problem of personal identity is not exclusively 
metaphysical, but engages central issues in ethics and moral psychology. Do the 
moral and mental forms of cultivation at the heart of Buddhist practice demand 
a robust notion of agency? Buddhism is indeed unique in articulating a theory 
of action that, it seems, dispenses altogether with the notion of agent causation. 
Even though practices of moral and mental cultivation form an integral part of the 
Buddhist path, there is no stable self or agent who bears the accumulated responsi-
bility for initiating those pursuits, and seemingly no normative framework against 
which some dispositions, thoughts, and actions are deemed felicitous, and thus 
worthy of cultivation, while others are not so deemed. The agent- neutral meta-
physical picture of Buddhist scholasticism thus challenges traditional conceptions 
of moral agency. One way to address this challenge is to claim that the discourse 
of ‘persons’ and the discourse of ‘causes’ are compatible in so far as they belong in 
two distinct and incommensurable domains. 15 Compatibilists who adopt this pos-
ition typically cite evidence from social and cognitive psychology to show that any 
robust notion of agent causation must be incoherent. 16 But, as I have argued else-
where, such solutions compromise traditional conceptions of moral responsibility 
and render ethical conduct indistinguishable from merely pragmatic acts (Coseru 
 2016 ). Indeed, despite the dominance of an ultraminimalist account of agency, there 
are good and compelling reasons to give Buddhist Personalists credit for insisting 
9781138595118_pi-260.indd   174 20-Jan-20   13:50:57
Reasons and conscious persons 175
that in so far as the aggregates operate in a person- constituting way, persons are 
ineliminable from our discourse about agency and moral responsibility. 17 
 Does Buddhist Personalism provide a closer analogue for Parfit’s theory of 
personal identity (and its psychological reductionism) than Buddhist Reductionism, 
with its stated mereological nihilist view that there are no such things as composite 
entities? I think that it does, for conceivability reasons: the psychological criterion 
is plausible only to the extent that I can conceive of myself in dependence upon a 
sufficiently similar series of aggregates. But the conceivability principle concerns 
the epistemological, rather than the ontological, dimension of personal identity, 
which brings up an altogether different set of considerations, specifically about the 
relations that obtain between self- referential mental states (those that presuppose the 
notion of oneself as an agent) and self- consciousness. The epistemological dimen-
sion is framed by a different set of questions that pertain not to what awareness 
supervenes on but to its structure and specific properties, specifically:  What in 
particular accounts for a mental state becoming an instance of self- consciousness? 
Does self- consciousness require that its self- referential relation is present to itself as 
an object? If we can answer these questions, we can make progress in understanding 
the relation between self- referential mental states and self- consciousness. And if 
we can get clarity about the nature and character of self- consciousness, we are in a 
better position to understand what it is that makes us persons. 18 
 Recall the schematic analysis of the five aggregates that informs the Buddhist 
Reductionist account of personal identity. In this analysis, only the body is a phys-
ical aggregate  stricto sensu . Feelings, perceptions, dispositions, and consciousness  can 
acquire an objective aspect, but are not properly speaking empirically tractable phe-
nomena. Nor are they things, that is, abstract entities with well- defined properties 
and functional characteristics. What this reductive analysis of persons in terms of their 
constitutive features is meant to capture is not what persons are  made of , but rather 
what human experience is  constituted as : specifically, as a series of intentional and self- 
referential mental events. Consider the paradigmatic example of pain: as a sensation, 
pain is not reducible to the physical substrate, say a finger, in which it is instantiated 
(nor presumably to a mere physiological response). Rather, pain is constituted as a 
distinctly qualitative phenomenon whose intentional content cannot be dissociated 
from its subjective aspect. There is no such thing as generic or impersonal pain (under-
stood strictly in terms of, say, the activation of A δ - and C- fibers following an intense 
stimulation of nociceptors) apart from phenomenologically foregrounded sensations 
of some kind: of burning, stinging, or throbbing. Feelings may define the quality of 
the impressions that result from contact with an object, with the implication that 
they perhaps stand in a causal relation with these objects. In the schematic analysis of 
Buddhist scholasticism, they are categorized as mental states conditioned by habitual 
tendencies ( v ā san ā ), which, in turn, they condition. Likewise, apperception ( sa ṃ j ñ ā ), 
the capacity to make intelligible or cause to be understood, although dependent 
on a multiplicity of psychological factors, captures the datum of experience only as 
unified into a single percept (since what Abhidharma psychology understands as a 
9781138595118_pi-260.indd   175 20-Jan-20   13:50:57
176 Christian Coseru
simple apprehension and identification of a sensible trope actually involves a signifi-
cant amount of unification of sensory input that goes on behind the scenes). Volitions 
too fit the same profile, with one important difference: rather than attending to the 
object at hand or providing a sort of transcendental unity of apperception, they bring 
forth future states of existence. As dispositions to act in certain ways, they cleave the 
mental domain into two classes of conditioned phenomena: those that are internal to 
consciousness, such as, for instance, obsessive dispositions like greed and delusion, and 
those that are dissociated from it, usually taken to refer to latent dispositions typically 
comprising various biological and physical traits. 19 
 This dynamic model of personal identity is not incompatible with the notion 
that there are phenomenally primitive features of experience, features that any 
analysis of the structure of self- consciousness must ultimately reveal. When the 
Buddhist Personalists insist that a mere functional account of the aggregates will 
not suffice to explain why an action counts as murder they draw attention to the 
specificity and individuality of a given bundle of aggregates, and hence, of its actions 
and consequences: “If the person were absolutely non- existent, then there could 
not be killing nor (nor?) would the killer have killed anything. There would be 
nothing like theft and robbery … good and bad would yield neither freedom nor 
bondage; even bondage would have no one bound. There would be neither the 
doer nor the deed not any result thereof” (Venkataramanan  1953 : 177). Indeed, 
understanding why something is categorized as murder and not simply as the 
rearranging of aggregates presupposes a conception of intentional action that is 
unintelligible without reference to persons. If living beings were mere conventional 
designations, as N ā gasena contends, then there would be no non- arbitrary way to 
assign guilt in the case of killing a sentient being, since killing a living ox would 
be no different from destroying a clay ox. 20 Unlike clumps of clay, living beings are 
characterized primarily in terms of their capacity for responsive and intentional 
action: they can both do things and have things done to them in a way unavailable 
to insentient objects. Persons, unlike mountains or chariots, are not simply generic 
unities of aggregates, but self- disclosing wholes. Persons are what they are by virtue 
of the fact that their aggregates are perceived to belong together. 21 Aggregates 
grouped together in a person- constituting way are specific to themselves in a way 
that mountains grouped together or chariot parts assembled together are not. 
 What are the implications of this position for Buddhist Reductionism in par-
ticular, and for the Reductionist View of personal identity in general? There are 
various responses to this question. One may take the reflexive structure of self- 
consciousness to point to deeper aspects of consciousness as conscience, 22 or delin-
eate several ways in which pronominal and indexical uses of the ‘I’ can engender 
a false sense of self. 23 One may also claim that the perceived unity of conscious-
ness results from certain patterns of attention to, and grasping of, various features 
of experience. 24 Whether one takes self- consciousness to have a distinctive struc-
ture and clearly specifiable content, for the Buddhist Reductionist no minimal 
account of agency can escape the antirealist stance of the no- self doctrine and its 
implications, namely that all modes of ‘I- making’ (and ‘I- sensing’) characteristic of 
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self- referential mental states must be conceptually constructed. This is precisely the 
reason why Siderits, for instance, thinks that we should take only causally efficacious 
particulars as providing metaphysical grounding (Siderits  2015 : 115). 
 Buddhist Reductionism does indeed pose a significant challenge for conceptions 
of phenomenal consciousness that take consciousness to consist in more than just a 
succession of associated ideas or a construct of post- hoc rationalization. However, 
by treating its contents as transient episodes arising within a continuum of caus-
ally interconnected states, Buddhist Reductionism itself confronts an epistemic 
explanatory gap: if all there is to the experiential domain is a stream of momentary, 
object- directed mental events, just what it means for an object to be known, and 
by whom? Can Buddhist Reductionism, with its account of primitive atom- like 
‘qualitons’ of experience, provide an adequate conceptual basis for mapping out the 
distinctly self- intimating character of knowledge episodes? To answer this question 
let me briefly consider an epistemological attempt to negotiate the difference 
between egological and non- egological accounts of self- consciousness, drawing 
principally on the work of Dign ā ga. 
 Building on the Abhidharma analytic project, Dign ā ga, not unlike Brentano, 
advances a dual- aspect theory of mind, which takes the subjective or qualitative 
aspect ( sv ā bh ā sa ) and the object- oriented or intentional aspect ( vi ṣ ay ā bhasa ) to be 
constitutive features of the structure of cognitive awareness. 25 In large measure, this 
theory rests on three distinct claims: (1) that we are directly aware of each occurrent 
mental state; (2) that each occurrent mental state has a dual aspect: it has both sub-
jective and objective content; and (3) that each occurrent mental state is also reflex-
ively self- conscious. The first claim goes against the view that occurrent mental 
states are ultimately impersonal or anonymous. To hold such a view would be akin 
to claiming that experience lacks a distinctly subjective character or possesses such 
character only by virtue of distortions embedded in the structure of ‘I- making’ 
and ‘self- grasping’ tendencies. 26 The second claim identifies subjectivity and inten-
tionality as distinct structural features rather than discrete elements of the mental 
domain. The subjective aspect is constitutive of an implicit openness to what is 
given, while the objective aspect captures what the mental state is about: an object 
or mental content of some kind. Finally, the third claim is intended to capture the 
mode of presentation of all conscious cognitive states. Incidentally, the first and third 
claims can also be read as making the case that effortful self- knowledge– – of the 
sort gained through introspection, intersubjective reports, or reflective attitudes– – 
depends on tacit or non- propositional modes of acquaintance. 
 This understanding of the structure of conscious experience is not unlike that 
put forward by those who argue that our subjectivity is immersive rather than 
egological. Consider, for instance, this statement from Zahavi, who takes Heidegger’s 
lead on this issue: “I am acquainted with myself when I am captured and captivated 
by the world. Self- acquaintance is indeed only to be found in our immersion in 
the world, that is, self- acquaintance is always the self- acquaintance of a world- 
immersed self ” (Zahavi  2005 :  82). On this view, self- acquaintance is not some-
thing that occurs apart from our immersion in the world and its complex set of 
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intentional and intersubjective relations. Reflecting on the mode of presentation of 
our mental states, P. F. Strawson likewise observes, “our desires and preferences are 
not, in general, something we just note in ourselves as alien presences. To a large 
extent they are we” (Strawson  1992 : 134). To claim, thus, that access to our mental 
lives is always mediated in some fashion or another, perhaps by participation in a 
shared domain of language and reflection– – is to ignore these essential features of 
self- consciousness. 
 Dign ā ga’s account of reflexive self- consciousness ( svasa ṃ vitti ) does raise some 
legitimate concerns, for instance, about the absurd consequence of admitting that 
all cognitions, by virtue of being self- presenting, are epistemically warranted. Yet the 
main issue, as I have argued at length elsewhere (Coseru  2012 , Chapter 8), is speci-
fying the criteria under which occurrent mental states become epistemically salient. 
A  reductive causal account that treats consciousness as emerging from elements 
that themselves lack phenomenal properties is necessarily incomplete if it does not 
explain how those elements acquire the phenomenal properties that they do when 
grouped together. Of course, not all groupings of microphysical elements need 
necessarily exhibit a reflexive structure. 27 But those that do call for an explanation 
that considers the whole person and not just its constitutive elements. In putting 
forward an account of consciousness as self- intimating, Dign ā ga is thus concerned 
to explain how a conscious mental episode, which is irreducible, can become the 
vehicle of self- knowledge. In that sense, he shares a common ground with, inter 
alia, Aristotle, Descartes, Locke, Brentano, Husserl, Sartre, and many contemporary 
defenders of the view that the nature of consciousness is such that all conscious 
mental states are non- representationally or pre- reflectively aware of themselves. 28 
The picture they present corresponds to what some have termed non- reductive 
“one- level theories of consciousness”:  that is, theories which propose that con-
sciousness is essentially a matter of having or being an awareness of a world that 
does not require a prior (representational) awareness of our own mental states 
(Thomasson  2008 ). 
 Reflexivism or the thesis that self- consciousness consists in mental states 
being implicitly conscious of their occurrence thus serves as a grounding prin-
ciple, enabling the intentional and subjective aspects of experience to emerge 
co- constitutively in each instance of cognitive awareness. Can such reflexive 
self- consciousness provide enough metaphysical grounding for thoughts of the 
sort ‘I am in pain’? Do such self- ascriptions require independent criteria (or the 
normative, indexical, or ownership kind) for individuating streams of conscious 
episodes to manifest as occurring  for me ? Can conscious mental states occur 
without any sense of whose states they are? Can there be consciousness without 
self- consciousness? 
 If reflexive self- consciousness has a distinctive character, a specific givenness 
or for- me- ness, then even misascriptions (as in the case of thought insertion or 
various pathologies of the self such as ego dissolution) would be unintelligible 
if thought were transparent with regard to its occurrent for- me- ness (Bermudez 
 1998 ; Zahavi & Kriegel  2015 ). Reflexivism, then, is simply a statement about the 
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self- intimating character of conscious mental states.  It is the condition for the possi-
bility of self- knowledge, rather than the achievement of self- knowledge . Because agency 
entails awareness of action and its consequences, persons (as self- conscious agents) 
are ultimately real in a way that chariots and forests are not. Reflexivism allows 
for a minimal conception of subjectivity, specifically one that works against the 
idea that there could be experiences that are generic or impersonal until they are 
attended to in reflective or introspective thought. As such, it addresses not only the 
problem of self- consciousness, but also the problem of subjectivity, of why it is that 
experiences present themselves as being not only  about something, but  for someone. 
It is only to the extent that experiences exhibit what has been called the ‘dative of 
manifestation’– – the fact that every experience is necessarily an experience  for (or 
given  to ) someone (Prufer  1975 )– – that we are in a position to understand what it 
is that makes us persons. 
 We may conclude that what makes the further fact view of there being persons 
plausible is the structure of consciousness itself. This way of understanding persons 
is not unlike Locke’s view of persons as self- conscious rational subjects. Neither a 
biological entity, nor an immaterial soul, a person is what it is by virtue of the fact 
that it,
 can consider it self as it self, the same thinking thing, in different times and 
places; which it does only by that consciousness, which is inseparable from 
thinking, and, as it seems to me essential to it: It being impossible for any one 
to perceive, without perceiving, that he does perceive. When we see, hear, 
smell, taste, feel, meditate, or will any thing, we know that we do so. … And 
as far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past Action or 
Thought, so far reaches the identity of that Person. 
  Locke 1689 2.27.9, 335 
 The Buddhist Personalist may eschew the requirement that the self- conscious subject-
ivity in play be manifest only in thought as rational deliberation and action, but agree 
that without self- consciousness it is hard to understand how self- concern, which is 
essential for moral cultivation, would be possible. For in looking to reward or punish 
persons for their deeds we do not look for a particular body, mental state or an imma-
terial substance of some sort, but rather “to connections between the consciousness of 
the one who did the deed and the one who is being held accountable.” (Ainslie and 
Ware 2014: 248). 29 Buddhist Personalists may also agree with Hume and the Parfitian 
version of the Reductionist View that our perceptions or sensible intuitions reveal no 
such thing as a fixed or stable self. Awareness of the inner contents of our mind lacks a 
necessary relation to a unified self. But while it may be true that we do not need to be 
self- conscious in a higher order or metacognitive sense in order to perceive and think, 
the operations of perception and thought do presuppose that conscious experiences 
are unified in such a way that their contents can be synthesized. And it is the unity of 
conscious experience, achieved in the constitutive operations of the aggregates, that 
Buddhist Personalists point to when they claim that persons are ultimately real. 
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 Conclusion 
 Parfit’s motivation for rejecting the Non- Reductionist View concerns the claim that 
there is more to being a person than what accounts of physical and psychological 
continuity can satisfactorily provide. The Non- Reductionist makes the ultimately 
unsupported claim that “the unity of consciousness at any time is explained by the 
fact that several experiences are being had by a person” (1984: 275). Split brain cases 
and teleportation thought experiments, however, make it hard to explain unity 
by insisting on the importance of maintaining personal identity over time across 
different streams of consciousness. In conceiving of unity in terms of the ascription 
of different experiences to a particular subject, we are confronted with the unwar-
ranted assumption that “there can be, in a person’s life, subjects of experiences that 
are not persons” (ibid.). Such cases are better explained, argues Parfit, by appealing 
to the Reductionist Psychology Criterion, which claims that “at any time, there 
is one state of awareness of the experiences in one stream of consciousness, and 
another state of awareness of the experiences in the other stream” (ibid.). 
 In developing the criteria for psychological reductionism, Parfit’s theoretical per-
spective points in the direction of a formal but variant structure of awareness. This 
structure ought to, at least in principle, be able to accommodate continuity without 
the sameness or identity that ascribing such states to something like a Cartesian 
Ego would entail. It is unlikely that Buddha and most Buddhist Reductionists 
would have agreed with this part of his theory. Although it is in keeping with the 
principles of the Buddhist no- self view, Parfit’s insistence on an external criterion 
for individuating or indexing awareness to a particular stream of consciousness may 
be at odds with what I have argued are certain salient and ineliminable features 
of phenomenal consciousness, specifically its self- reflexivity. If self- reflexive con-
scious episodes lack an intentional structure, then they cannot provide the minimal 
sense of internal distance necessary for subjectivity. On the dual aspect model of 
consciousness sketched above (see also Coseru  2015 , 66, 79), mental streams are 
differentiated by being covariant with intentional behavior, which presupposes that 
subjectivity and intentionality are structural features of consciousness, rather than 
constructs or relations among discrete mind moments (as presupposed by mereo-
logical nihilists). 
 This chapter has considered whether Buddhist Reductionism provides support 
for Parfit’s psychological criterion for personal identity given considerations about 
the seemingly irreducible character of phenomenal consciousness. Taking Buddhist 
Personalism as a point of reference, I have argued that reductionism about selves 
can be reconciled with the seemingly irreducible character of self- consciousness. 
Furthermore, Buddhist philosophers who follow in the footsteps of Dign ā ga and 
his successors provide a viable, if not altogether unproblematic, model for how 
this reconciliation might proceed. Whether or not this epistemological project is 
constrained by ontological assumptions about the constitutive elements of persons 
is open to debate. What is less controversial is that in rejecting a permanent locus for 
experience, the Buddha created an opportunity for the problem of personal identity 
9781138595118_pi-260.indd   180 20-Jan-20   13:50:57
Reasons and conscious persons 181
to be explored not only on metaphysical but on empirical and phenomenological 
grounds as well. What sets apart non-reductive theories of persons as self-conscious 
subjects from their alternatives, then, is the notion that personal identity is not really 
a matter of the persistence or continuity of enough of the constitutive (physical and 
psychological) elements of persons, as demanded by the psychological criterion. 
Rather, on the model put forward here, it is a matter of understanding that the 
principle of individuation is neither external nor transcendent but internal to the 
structure of consciousness and its operations. 
 Notes 
  1  Within philosophy of mind, reductionism is concerned mainly with solving the mind- 
body problem, rather than, as was the case with Carnap ( 1934 ) and Neurath (1931), with 
the unity of scientific theories. Hence, the main motivation for reductionism with regard 
to questions of personal identity is ontological parsimony. 
  2  In the case of intertheoretic reduction, the question is whether the atomic and continuum 
scale models can be bridged. While some reductionists think that in principle it is possible 
to derive continuum scale entities from atomic scale details (Batterman  1995 ), others (in 
particular those who favor top- down modeling) take the view that what we can hope for 
at most is identifying a set of intertheoretic relations (Berry  2001 ) rather than a hierarchy 
of theories operating at different scales. The upshot of this debate is that philosophical 
theories of reduction, which are typically modeled on scientific theories, must come to 
terms with the fact that reduction is problematic even in the case of the natural sciences. 
  3  One way to understand the difference between the non- reductionist and the reductionist 
views of personal identity is along the simple/ complex divide:  the non- reductionist 
favors the simple, soul or Cartesian Ego, view, whereas the reductionist prefers the com-
plex view that entails relations among physical and psychological states. Holding a soul 
view, of course, does not necessarily amount to holding a brute fact view, although in the 
absence of non- circular criteria for personal identity (of the sort required by the com-
plex view) it is hard to tell them apart. What motivates recent defenders of the simple 
view (e.g., Baker  2013 ; Lowe 2009,  2013 ; Nida- R ü melin  2013 , Swinburne  2013 ) is 
not commitment to a Cartesian Ego, but rather the notion that a specific, perhaps non- 
conceptual and pre- reflective, type of self- awareness seems indispensable to framing any 
account of personal identity. I address this point below, in §4. 
  4  Parfit supports his claim regarding indeterminacy with the case of the Combined 
Spectrum, which, as the name suggests, involves all the possible variations of physical and 
psychological connectedness between such substantially altered person stages that the 
person I am now would in no way be connected with the one at the further end of the 
spectrum. 
  5  The first to draw attention to their similarity was Collins (1985), though in a subsequent 
article (Collins  1997 ) he softened his position, regarding the two views as similar rather 
than identical. Similar attempts to draw together the two views and to adopt a Parfitian 
conceptual schema in pursuing various projects in Buddhist philosophy are found in 
Bastow ( 1986 ), Stone ( 1988 ,  2005 ), Giles ( 1993 ), Duerlinger ( 1993 ), Basu ( 1997 ), Siderits 
( 1997 , 2003), Perrett ( 2002 ), Ganeri ( 2007 ), and Sauchelli ( 2016 ). 
  6  Parfit first articulated his views on personal identity as early as his 1971 paper “Personal 
Identity,” so that by the time  Reasons and Persons was published, his views were widely 
known, and had already generated a great deal of discussion. 
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  7  Parfit gets around the problematic issue of the relation between episodic and semantic 
memory by appealing to  q - memory (quasi memory– – a new category of memory first 
introduced by Shoemaker ( 1970 )). According to Parfit, “I am q- remembering an experi-
ence if (1) I have a belief about a past experience which seems in itself like a memory 
belief, (2) someone did have such an experience, and (3) my belief is dependent upon this 
experience in the same way in which a memory of an experience is dependent upon it” 
(1971: 15). 
  8  This text, along with Vasubandhu’s  Treasury of Metaphysics ( Abhidharmako ś abh ā ṣ ya ) and 
Buddhaghosa’s  Path to Purity ( Visuddhimagga ), serve as his main source of Buddhist ideas 
about personal identity. Parfit includes several passages from these texts, excerpted from 
Stcherbatsky’s ( 1919 ) seminal work on the Buddhist no- self doctrine. He also cites Collins’ 
( 1982 ) landmark study of the early Buddhist doctrine of  anatta . See also Collins ( 1997 ) 
for a response that considers the extent to which support for a reductionist account of 
personal identity on the Parfitian model can indeed be found in the Buddhist tradition. 
  9  For an overview of the impact that Parfit’s categorical framework and theoretical 
perspectives (on metaphysics and ethics) have had on Buddhist philosophy, see Hanner 
( 2018 ). 
 10  All references are to the second edition, Siderits ( 2015 ). 
 11  Buddhist Personalists (Pudgalav ā da) include the V ā ts ī putriyas and the S ā ṃ mit ī yas, 
though their exact views on persons are hard to reconstruct since they are mostly 
preserved in unsympathetic treatments by their critics, mainly in the  Points of 
Controversy ( Kath ā vatthu ), Vasubandhu’s  Treasury of Metaphysics ( Abhidharmako ś abh ā ṣ ya ), 
Harivarman’s  True Attainment Treatise ( Satyasiddhi ś ā stra ), Devasarman’s  Body of 
Consciousness ( Vij ń ā nak ā ya ), and  Ś ā ntarak ṣ ita’s  Compendium of Principles ( Tattvasa ṃ graha ). 
The only source that presents their views unbiasedly is the  S ā ṃ mitiya Nik ā ya 
 Ś ā stra , now preserved only in Chinese (an English translation in Venkataramanan 
( 1953 )). The prevalent interpretation, gleaned from the  Points of Controversy , is that 
Pudgalav ā dins take persons to be ultimately real. According to most of the other 
sources, Pudgalav ā dins think persons occupy an ontological position somewhere 
between conventional and ultimate reality. See Priestly (1999) for detailed studies of 
Buddhist Personalism, and also Ch â u ( 1999 ) for a general survey and reconstruction 
of their views. 
 12  The refutation, known as  Treatise on the Negation of the Person , is appended as Chapter 9 
of Vasubandhu’s  Treasury of Metaphysics ( Abhidharmako ś abh ā ṣ ya ). See Duerlinger ( 2003 ) for 
a detailed treatment of this section of Vasubandhu’s treatise. 
 13  For a response to the argument from overdetermination, see Sider ( 2003 ). 
 14  In particular, Crane ( 2010 ), Noordhof ( 2010 ), and Kistler ( 2010 ). 
 15  Proponents of this move include, inter alia, Siderits ( 1997 ,  2008 ), Flanagan ( 2002 ), and 
Meyers ( 2014 ). 
 16  See Caruso ( 2012 ), Smart ( 2006 ), and Wegner ( 2002 ) for various attempts to prove the 
illusory nature of experiences of mental causation. While not conclusive, Nahmias et al. 
( 2004 ) review experimental data that seems to favor compatibilist over incompatibilist 
accounts of free will. 
 17  See Carpenter ( 2015 ) for a sympathetic treatment of Buddhist Personalism that proposes 
a new, constitutive or developmental model for understanding the Pudgalav ā da, aimed 
at extending the categorical framework of Buddhist metaphysics. On this model, the 
aggregates (of perception, consciousness, etc.) relate to each other in a person- constituting 
way, which she regards as “the most minimal explanation possible” that must be accepted 
if we are “to do justice to the phenomena  without adopting a substantialist theory of self ” 
(2015: 27). 
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 18  A similar strategy is at work in Garrett ( 1998 ), though the focus there is on the 
connections between ‘I’- judgments and self- consciousness. Garrett finds Anscombe’s 
view that the first- person singular pronoun is not a referring term unsupported, and 
builds a strong case for language use as an intentional activity: although not all language 
use exhibits intentional activity, self- consciousness must be understood as consisting “in 
the presence of an intention to self- refer” (Garrett  1998 : 96). 
 19  See, e.g.,  Treasury of Metaphysics ( Abhidharmako ś abh ā ṣ ya ) 2.23– 34 in de la Vall é e Poussin 
( 1980 : 45– 62). 
 20  For Harivarnan’s discussion of some of the ethical implications of the no- self view in 
 Satyasiddhi ś ā stra , see Priestly (1999: 96). 
 21  Carpenter ( 2015 :  23f) thinks the “belonging together” clause is not just a matter of 
spatiotemporal proximity, a feature shared by all aggregates that belong together, but 
something having to do with their functionality and development, even though in the 
end she admits that functionality alone is not sufficient to distinguish persons from 
chariots. 
 22  This is the strategy adopted by Harvey ( 1995 ). 
 23  Collins ( 1982 ) offers precisely such an analysis. 
 24  This position, first articulated by Albahari ( 2006 ), is developed at length by Ganeri 
( 2017 ). 
 25  See, e.g.,  Compendium of Epistemology ( Pram ā ṇ asamuccaya ) 1.10, in Hattori ( 1968 : 29). See 
also Coseru ( forthcoming ) for a discussion of Dign ā ga’s theory relative to the problem of 
self- knowledge. 
 26  This view is attributed to Asa ṅ ga. As he observes in the  Compendium of the Great Vehicle :
 How does one know that mind ( manas ) in the sense of ‘afflicted mind’ ( kli ṣ ṭ a- 
manas ) exists? Without it, there would be no uncompounded ignorance, that is, 
a basic ignorance not yet associated with all the faults ( do ṣ a ), but serving as their 
base ( ā ś raya ). Indeed, introspective awareness ( mano- vij ñ ā na ) must also have a sim-
ultaneous basis, as do the five types of empirical consciousness whose support 
are their material organs. Such a simultaneous support can only be found in the 
‘afflicted mind.’ 
 Mah ā y ā na- samgraha 1.6– 7 in Lamotte  1938 : 36 
 27  Micropsychism, roughly the view that human consciousness derives from a com-
bination of micro- conscious entities, might be taken as the exception here (see, e.g., 
Strawson  2006 ). But micropsychism faces the well- known combination problem (Seager 
1995):  how exactly do micro- level entities with their own very basic forms of con-
sciousness combine together to form human consciousness? In response to the com-
bination problem, some defenders of panpsychism reject the atomistic metaphysics of 
micropsychism in favor of cosmopsychism, which holds that individual human conscious-
ness is derived from, or an expression of, a single unified field of consciousness (Jaskolla 
& Buck  2012 ; Shani  2015 ,  2018 ; Nagasawa & Wager  2016 ; Goff  2017 ). Cosmopsychism 
faces the opposite problem, namely the decombination problem: how do we get from a 
unified field of consciousness to individual human and animal consciousness. 
 28  See Strawson ( 2015 ) for a defense of the self- intimation thesis that draws together these 
major figures. 
 29  As Ainslie and Ware make quite clear, Locke not only defends the view, typically 
associated with Sartre, that consciousness is reflexive (that is, consciousness entails self- 
consciousness), but also (and more controversially) that consciousness is not “limited 
simply to our occurrent mental states” but rather extends its contents from one conscious 
moment to the next (2014: 249). 
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